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Spetsbanks (specialized banks)This paper examines whether privatizing state-owned banks improves ﬁnance and economic growth. To do so,
we exploit regional banking variations in Russia induced by the idiosyncratic creation of “specialized banks” in
the last years of the Soviet Union (1988–91) that were subsequently privatized. Starting in 1999 private banks
including surviving spetsbanks emerged as an important source of external ﬁnance for private ﬁrms and house-
holds. We document that the regional concentration of spetsbanks in the early years of the Russian federation
is orthogonal to economic fundamentals that are related to growth after the emergence of bank ﬁnance. Results
indicate that while privatized banking increased lending signiﬁcantly, it did not increase economic growth.
However, privatization did increase growth when banks retained fewer political connections and when regional
property rights were better protected, highlighting the importance of both factors.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
A large literature documents that government-owned banks are in-
efﬁcient compared to private banks (e.g., Cole, 2009; Khwaja and Mian,
2005; La Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004). These studies thus raise the
question of whether countries should privatize their government-
owned banks. On that issue, signiﬁcant attention has been paid to the
impact of privatization on banking behavior, with a focus on outcomes
like operating efﬁciency and proﬁtability (see Clarke et al. (2005) and
Megginson (2005) for excellent overviews.) However, as Megginson
(2005) points out, the data on ﬁnancial performance for banks tend to
be “more opaque than usual for an industry that under the best of cir-
cumstances suffers from the lack of transparency in ﬁnancial reporting.”
In addition, the critical question is whether bank privatization improves
economic growth by improving overall ﬁnance. Thus, while there is(our editor) for their comments.
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. This is an open access article underconsiderable evidence that banking is important for economic growth
(e.g., Guiso et al., 2004; Jayartne and Strahan, 1996; King and Levine,
1993), little is known about whether privatized banks are similarly
effective.1
This paper directly examines the impact of privatized banking on ﬁ-
nance and economic growth in Russia. We ask whether privatizing
state-owned banks and allowing them to compete against other private
banks is sufﬁcient to transform them into growth-creating ﬁnancial
intermediaries. To distinguish the effects of bank privatization from
confounding factors, we exploit the creation of specialized banks
(“spetsbanks”) in the Russian regions in the ﬁnal years of the Soviet
Union (1987–1991). The intention of the spetsbank reform was to
improve the workings of the Soviet economy. Moreover, the new
spetsbanks were made from Soviet socialist banks: the reform did not
create physically new banks or branches. Thus, the regional concentra-
tion of spetsbanks after 1987 is based on bank branch location patterns
established in the Soviet economy long before 1987, which were
arguably unrelated to economic fundamentals and long term growth.
The spetsbanks and most all other commercial banks in Russia were
privatized in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Bank ﬁnance emerges in
Russia circa 1999, and by 2006 the surviving spetsbanks supply roughly
one-ﬁfth of the loans to private ﬁrms and households.1 One notable study related to the privatization of banking is Cole (2009), who cleverly
identiﬁes the impact of bank nationalization in India in 1980 using bank deposit rules. An
open question is whether the impact of privatization is the mirror opposite of the impact
of nationalization.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
4 We ﬁnd only a small number of cases in which spetsbanks operated under more than
one of these supra-banks.
5 There are several explanations for why the Gosbank system was transformed in this
way. One is spetsbanks were created in order to increase the number of privileged man-
agement positions within the old Soviet command system. Another explanation is the
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with a high concentration of spetsbanks in the early years of the
Russian federation would have grown at the same rate as other regions
in the absences of the additional spetsbanks. We expect this to be
the case because of the idiosyncratic way that spetsbanks emerged
from the traditional Soviet banking system. Using rich regional data,
we validate our identifying assumption. First, we show that the regional
concentration of spetsbanks that survived till 1995 was uncorrelated
with economic growth from 1993 to 1996, as well as with per capita in-
come levels in 1996. That is, regions that would subsequently receive
more privatized banking had previously grown at the same rate as
other regions. And second, we show that our estimates of the impact
of spetsbank concentration on ﬁnance and growth are unaffected by
the inclusion of twenty controls measuring pre-banking determinants
of ﬁnance and growth. These controls include per capita income levels
in 1996 as well as measures of government involvement in markets,
the political environment, institutional quality, urbanization, and demo-
graphics from the Russian and Soviet eras. Thus, it is clear that the
regional concentration of spetsbanks was not correlated with either
income levels or growth rates prior to the rise of modern banking in
Russia, or with a host of determinants of ﬁnance and economic growth:
and, these ﬁndings support our identiﬁcation strategy.
Results indicate that bank privatizationwas good for ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that regions that have onemore spetsbank
per million population in 1995—approximately a one half standard de-
viation increase—registered an 11 to 22% increase in lending to private
ﬁrms and individuals during the period 2002–2006. However, bank pri-
vatization did not increase investment or real per capita income growth
from 1996 to 2007. This is true despite the fact that there was robust
growth in real income in Russia during this time period (Berkowitz
and DeJong, 2011). In contrast, some evidence suggests the primary
consequence of the increased banking via privatization was to reduce
unemployment.
Additional results provide some lessons about the conditions under
which bank privatization can promote investment and growth. We
ﬁnd that privatized banking did increase growth in regions in which
spetsbanks were less connected to government and where the regions
had better protections of property rights. Thus, our results indicate
that bank privatization is likely to be most effective when it is part of a
package of reforms that strengthen property rights andweaken connec-
tions between banks and politicians.
2. Banking in the former Soviet Union and in Russia
In the former Soviet Union, the mono-bank Gosbank issued credits
to state owned enterprises (SOEs) so that they could fulﬁll administered
plan targets. SOEs typically had “soft” budget constraints, which meant
they could get credits from Gosbank for fulﬁlling plan targets even if
their projects were unproﬁtable and served no particular need.2 State
owned banks were part of the Gosbank system and collected taxes
from state owned enterprises (SOEs) and monitored the extent to
which the SOEs were fulﬁlling centrally administered plan targets.3
In the last years of the Soviet Union, 1987–1991, several reforms
of the state-owned banks were proposed. A landmark reform was the
1987 law on state-owned enterprises which included measures de-
signed to improve the workings of the Soviet planned economy such
as hardening the SOEs' “soft budget constraint” borrowing from the
state-owned banks. At about the same time, a working group with
representatives from Gosbank and Stroibank (the Construction Bank
that was a subsidiary of Gosbank) divided the Soviet banking system
into a central bank and ﬁve kinds of commercial banks. This division
went into effect January of 1988. Two of these commercial banks—the2 See, e.g., Kornai et al. (2003).
3 See Garvy (1977), Chapter 2); Hellman (1993, pp.83–92) for excellent overviews of
the role of banks in the Soviet era.old Soviet foreign trade bank and the old Soviet savings bank—were
renamed, but otherwise stayed the same and remained under the
control of the Gosbank. The remaining banks from Gosbank and its
subsidiary Stroikank (the Soviet bank for construction) became special-
ized banks (spetsbanks) and operated in general under the regulation
of one of the following supra-spetsbanks: the Agroprombank (the
agricultural–industrial bank), Zhilsotsbank (the banks for housing and
social development) and the Promstroibank (the banks for industrial–
construction).4 For the rest of this paper the banks operating under
Agprombank, Zhilsotbank and Promstroibank and their successors are
denoted “spetsbanks.”
Spetsbanks were not given the administrative tools necessary to
function as ﬁnancial intermediaries in a market system.While Gosbank
transferred assets and cash reserves, control over the interbank clearing
system, and control over personnel policy to the spetsbanks, Gosbank
did not initially give the spetsbanks control over their credit and interest
rate policies.5While the spetsbanks had been created in early 1988, even
by 1990 the Vice President of the planning department of the newly
formed supra-bank Agroprombank complained that the spetsbanks
in the Agroprombank division were still operating like traditional so-
cialist banks. This is because they took money from the Soviet Central
(GOSbank) and passively allocated these funds to the SOEs:
“Currently the main source of funds of Agroprombank (80% share)
are centralised credit resources supplied to Agroprombank by the
GOSbank of the USSR at a rate that has been determined at 1.5%”
[Danilets, banks start to work on a commercial basis, Deng'i i Kredit,
11, 1990, p. 53–57]
At about the same time that the Soviet leaders were creating
the spetsbank system and the Soviet Union Central Bank, the leaders
of the Russian Republic were creating the Central Bank of Russia
(CBR). The CBR worked to transfer all of the assets and liabilities
of the supra-spetsbanks (the Agroprombank, Zhilsotsbank and the
Promstroibank) to their local branches, and then gave the bank
managers in the local branches the power to form a small bank or join
with other branches in a larger bank, thus creating hundreds of
spetsbanks (Abanrbanell and Meyendorff, 1997, p.70).6 This informal
and spontaneous privatization of the supra-spetsbanks and the emer-
gence of spetsbanks in the Russian regions deprived the Soviet Union
Central Bank of control over Russian bank branch managers.
As of 1990 the spetsbanks still lacked the necessary tools to function
as ﬁnancial intermediaries, even though there were policies in place for
commercializing them. In 1990members of the editorial board of the of
the leading Soviet ﬁnance journal “Dengi i Kredit” (Money and Credit)
argued that the commercialized spetsbanks were still operating like
traditional Soviet socialist banks.
“…the commercialisation of the spetsbanks by turning them into
joint stock banks… leaves no doubt that these new institutionswill
in practice remain state institutions… These banks, being pocket
banks put together by ministries and industrial groups, will not get
their funds on the market (i.e. not on commercial terms), but from
within the limits… of their founding organizations (among which
the state budget) and will accordingly function as a channel for
disbursing ﬁnancial resources to loss-making and inefﬁcientspetsbanks were established as part of a turf war between powerful administrators in
the former Soviet Union and the former Russian Socialist Republic (which subsequently
became Russia).
6 Many regional branches did separate from these three banks and established new re-
gional banks within the regional branches of the Central Bank of Russia (Schoors, 2003).
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of the transition to the market (materials of a meeting of the
editorial board of the Dengi i Kredit), Dengi i Kredit, 12, 1990,
p.3–16: p. 15]
Dengi i Kredit was the journal of the Soviet Central Bank (Gosbank),
and at the time the Russian federation was taking measures to break
away from USSR. Thus, arguably, powerful Soviet bureaucrats may
have used Dengi i Kredit to publish pro-Soviet Union/anti-Russian
federation propaganda. Nevertheless, in her authoritative study of
banking at the end of the Soviet Union and its evolution in the Russian
Federation in the 1990s, Juliet Johnson documents that the spetsbanks
“had few incentives to operate in a market-oriented way” (Johnson,
2000, p.30).
In sum, the reforms allowing for the emergence of spetsbanks essen-
tially represented a marginal loosening of the historic relationship be-
tween the Gosbank and existing banks and bank branches.7 Moreover,
these reforms did not physically create new banks or bank branches.
Thus, the location of the spetsbanks was based on the pre-existing loca-
tion of Soviet banks. Importantly, in Section 5 we will provide evidence
showing the location of this inherited Soviet ﬁnancial infrastructurewas
unrelated to economic fundamentals predictive of long-term growth.
After the top-down creation of the spetsbanks, the Law on Coopera-
tion in May 1988 gave individuals and SOEs the right to open “coopera-
tive ventures.” In general cooperatives bought and sold goods and
services at free market prices and operated outside the state system of
input and output quotas. This law set off a rapid and unexpected spon-
taneous bottom-up entry of banks that we denote “non-spetsbanks.”
While spetsbanks were created from existing Soviet socialist banks
and branches, non-spetsbanks were located in newly formed coopera-
tive enterprises. Unlike the spetsbanks, the non-spetsbanks immedi-
ately played the role of commercial banks and provided funding to
cooperative and state owned enterprises.
The top-down creation of spetsbanks shaped the evolution and loca-
tion decisions of non-spetsbanks for two reasons. First, while the re-
forms put SOEs under increasing pressure to operate proﬁtably, the
newly created spetsbanks did not have the administrative capacity to ﬁ-
nance SOEs' projects. Thus, Gosbank, in an effort to develop new sources
of ﬁnance for the SOEs, set low registration fees for the non-spetsbanks
(Hellman, p.1993, p.139). Secondly, spetsbank managers could make
money by transferring the resources that they received through the
state system into these non-spetsbanks. This made it attractive for
new non-spetsbanks to locate near existing spetsbanks. For example,
cheap state-sector credits could be diverted to the non-spetsbanks,
“which could in turn loan out the money at higher interest rates to en-
terprises in the credit-starved cooperative sector” (Johnson, 2000, p.35).
For example, the supra-spetsbanks Promstroibank helped manage
the initial registration of commercial and cooperative banks, and quickly
became a shareholder in 50 of these new banks.8 This has important im-
plications for our paper, since it suggests that not all of the lending in-
duced by the initial regional concentration of the spetsbanks would
come directly from them. Instead, one would expect that the initial
presence of the spetsbanks would spur additional lending by other
nearby banks that had strategically located nearby in the early 1990s.
These other banks include the non-spetsbanks that entered when the
Soviet Union was intact and the new banks that entered after the de-
mise of the Soviet Union: all of these banks were private commercial
banks.
The Russian Federation emerged on December 31, 1991 when the
Soviet Union legally ceased to exist. From 1992 to 1998 the spetsbanks
and the new banks performed many of the tasks that Soviet socialist7 For more evidence of this, see Johnson (2000), chapter 2, footnotes 4, 11 and 52 and
Hellman (1993), pp.91–125.
8 International Monetary Fund et al, A Study of the Soviet Economy: Volume 2 (Paris: IMF,
1991), p.117, Annual Reopirt of Promstroibank of 1992, 1993 and 1994.banks did, including providing credit to state ﬁrms, ﬁnancing state-
related programs, and ﬁnancing government debt (see Tompson,
1997). In a study of the Russian banking sector, the World Bank (1993)
reports:
“About half of all commercial bank loans in 1992were in the form of
directed credits funded by the central bank or the budget. These
loans often serve as (i) subsidies to compensate distortions affecting
the borrower, such as price controls, (ii) a means to compensate
enterprises for the provision of social services, or (iii) a means to
subsidize employment” [World Bank, 1993, p.4].
Spetsbanks, non-spetsbanks, and new banks formed after the disso-
lution of the USSR made substantial proﬁts transferring central bank
credits to state owned enterprises and exploiting negative real interest
rates on bank deposits up till 1995. They also invested in foreign curren-
cies and precious metals in a variety of ways throughout the 1990s.
Similarly, all of these banks made a great deal of money issuing high-
interest government bonds known as GKOs starting around 1995
(Shleifer and Treisman, 2001, Chapter 4). At the same time, because
Russian banks made so few private sector loans, private ﬁrms had to ﬁ-
nance projectswith internal funds or funds raised fromnon-bank exter-
nal sources, even though they could earn an unusually high return on
their capital (see Johnson et al., 2002). In return for providing ﬁnance
to the government, some commercial banks were able to buy up state
assets at very low prices.9
Overall, from August of 1992 through 1998 Russian commercial
banks were proﬁtable without serving as a signiﬁcant source of ﬁnance
to private ﬁrms and households. Speculative bank activities along with
falling world oil prices and the Asian crisis likely contributed to
the near collapse of the Russian ﬁnancial system in August of 1998.
Following the crisis the Russian government defaulted on its domestic
and international debts, GDP fell almost 5%, therewas amassive outﬂow
of capital from Russia, and hundreds of Russian banks went bankrupt.
After the ﬁnancial crisis, there was a large increase in the growth of
exports due in part to both themassive devaluation of the ruble and the
large increase in world oil prices. It was during this period that banks
became a signiﬁcant source of external ﬁnance to private ﬁrms and
households: between 1999 and 2007 bank-issued loans to ﬁrms as a
share of GDP went from 10.5% to 37.3%. Moreover, during this period
real income overall grew rapidly and there was also substantial varia-
tion in the growth in bank ﬁnance and income across the regions (see
Berkowitz and DeJong, 2011). Thus, the period after the ﬁnancial crisis
is a good testing ground for whether the privatization of banks in
Russia in the mid-1990s was good for ﬁnance and for growth.
3. Identiﬁcation strategy and methodology
Estimating the causal impact of the bank privatization on ﬁnance
and growth is difﬁcult because of the potential for simultaneity and se-
lection biases. That is, onemightworry that countries that grow quickly
and are rich can afford to privatize banks and pay for the relatively high
salaries and the expensive infrastructure in a private banking sector.
One might also worry that fast-growing and rich countries have more
demand for loans, which might create a demand for a private sector
that can more quickly dispense loans. Finally, bank privatization often
arises as part of a package of reforms, such as simultaneous elimination
of price controls and modernization of corporate governance proce-
dures. As a result, it can be difﬁcult to disentangle the impact of bank
privatization from other reforms.
To overcome these identiﬁcation problems, we exploit the variation
in the number of spetsbanks per million inhabitants across the Russian
regions in October of 1995. The identifying assumption is that regions9 The most famous case is the “loans for shares” deal in 1995 in which the Yeltsin gov-
ernment effectively sold interests in lucrative nickel, oil and steel companies to bankers.
11 In robustness tests shown later we document that the main results are similar when
96 D. Berkowitz et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 93–106with many spetsbanks would have grown at the same rate as regions
with few spetsbanks in the absence of privatized banking. This assump-
tion is consistent with our discussion of how the location of the
spetsbanks was determined largely on the basis of bureaucratic reasons
inherited from the Soviet era, rather than economic ones.
Nonetheless, we test this identifying assumption empirically by
asking whether the concentration of spetsbanks predicts either the log
of per capita income in 1996 or the annual growth rate in personal
income from 1993 to 1996, both of which were prior to the period
when Russian banks made substantial loans to private ﬁrms and to
households. Formally, we estimate the following:
PreBankingOutcomei ¼ θ0 þ θ1Spetsbanki þ εi ð1Þ
where i denotes the ith region, PreBanking Outcomemeasures either log
income per capita in 1996 or the growth rate in real income per capita
from 1993 to 1996, and Spetsbank is the number of spetsbanks per
million population in October of 1995.10 The coefﬁcient of interest is θ1.
After empirically assessing the exogeneity of the spetsbank varia-
tion, we turn to whether additional spetsbanks increased bank ﬁnance
in the 2000s. That is, we examine whether regions with higher concen-
trations of spetsbanks in October of 1995—a period when there was al-
most no lending in Russia—havemore lending in the 2000s than regions
with lower concentrations of spetsbanks in 1995. Formally, we estimate
the following:
Bank Outcomei ¼ β0 þ β1Spetsbanki þ β2Xi þ ui ð2Þ
where Bank Outcomei denotes either the log of lending per capita by re-
gion of the lender, log of lending per capita by region of the borrower, or
the interest rate charged. Bank outcomes are measured from 2002 to
2006. X is a vector of covariates. In addition, in some speciﬁcations we
also control for the concentration of non-spetsbanks, deﬁned as all
other banks that were registered during 1987–1991 and survived till
October 1995, and new banks, deﬁned as those that registered after
1991 and survived till October 1995. Importantly, these banks entered
to ﬁnance the semi-private activity in the last years of the USSR and
the early years of the Russian Federation. Thus, in contrast to the crea-
tion of spetsbanks, the creation of non-spetsbanks and new banks is
endogenous to market conditions.
Finally,we examinewhether the increased lending caused by having
a higher concentration of spetsbanks in 1995 leads to differences in re-
gional economic outcomes including investment, per capita income,
unemployment, and the share of small business activity years later in
2007. To do this we replace the variable Bank Outcomei in Eq. (2) with
variables measuring regional economic outcomes in 2007.
We estimatemodels without andwith control variables X,which in-
clude pre-banking per capita income and 19 other variables measuring
demographics, political environment, institutional quality, and govern-
ment involvement in markets. To the extent that our estimates are
unaffected by the inclusion of covariates Xi that predict ﬁnance and
growth in a signiﬁcantway,we gain some conﬁdence that including un-
observed determinants of ﬁnance, investment and economic growth
would also not matter (Altonji et al., 2005).
One important implication of our research design is that the coefﬁ-
cient of interest is a local average treatment effect that captures the ef-
fect of the increased lending induced by the privatization of successors
to the original spetsbanks (Angrist et al., 1996). Thus,while these results
are informative regarding the impact of privatization induced by the
top-down creation of spetsbanks in the ﬁnal years of the Soviet Union,
they may be less informative of the causal impact of other types of10 We use data on the number of spetsbanks permillion inhabitants rather than a size or
asset-weightedmeasure of spetsbanks because there are no reliable data on assets prior to
1999. In addition, in 1999 we observe assets only for the 58% of the original spetsbanks
that survived until 1999.bank privatization on ﬁnance and growth. We return to this question
of interpretation later in the paper.
4. Data
Data on spetsbank and non-spetsbank status come from “A Guide to
Russian Bank Data” (Karas and Schoors, 2010), as collected from various
publications from the Central Bank of Russia. This source contains the
registration records of all Russian banks from August 1988 through
April 2007. Banks are classiﬁed as Soviet era spetsbanks if they were
registered as an Agprombank, a Zhilsotbank, or a Promstroibank no
later than December 30, 1991, as the Soviet Union no longer existed
and the Russian federation instituted market reforms shortly after
this date. All other banks registered no later than December 30, 1991
are denoted non-spetsbanks: these banks entered primarily after
the announcement of the Law on Cooperation in May 1988. All banks
registered after December 30, 1991 are denoted new banks. The non-
spetsbanks and new banks enter spontaneously and function as private
commercial banks.
In our baseline analysis we exclude the major cities Moscow and
St. Petersburg because their ﬁnancial markets were much more ad-
vanced than all other regions in Russia (see Berkowitz and DeJong,
2011).11 Thus, our data cover 74 of Russia's 83 regions.12
Thebank registry contains records only for those banks that survived
until October 1, 1995. Some spetsbanks that registered before December
30, 1991 subsequently were absorbed by the agricultural spetsbanks
(Agprombank), while otherswent out of business. Of the 1307 commer-
cial banks in operation on October 1, 1995, 196 of them (15%) were
spetsbanks, 471 were non-spetsbanks (36%) and 640 (49%) were new
banks. Additionally, our measures are conditional on survival as a
spetsbank, non-spetsbank or new bank through October 1, 1995. This
is reasonable since there was little bank lending activity to private
ﬁrms and households as of October 1, 1995.
Spetsbanks, non-spetsbanks and new banks are reported in terms of
regional population (in millions) at the start of 1996. In our baseline
sample, the average region has 1.9 spetsbanks per million inhabitants
with standard deviation of 1.9: six regions have no spetsbanks, and
the Altai Republic has ten. There are 4.5 non-spetsbanks per million
population (standard deviation is 4.1) and 5.7 new banks per million
population (standard deviation is 5.7). Consistent with our argument
that spetsbanks shaped the entry of non-spetsbanks and new banks,
the correlation between the regional concentration of spetsbanks and
non-spetsbanks (new banks) in 1995 is 0.56 (0.37).
Three measures of regional bank ﬁnance are used including lending
per capita by the region of the lender, lending per capita by the region of
the borrower, and the loan interest rate charged by the banks. These
variables are measured during the period 2002 through 2006. This al-
lows us to test whether having additional spetsbanks increases lending
or bank competition in the years preceding 2007, when we measure
economic outcomes of interest. All lending variables are deﬂated by a
regional consumer price index (April 2007 = 100) acquired from
Roskomstat (Web site: www.gks.ru) and expressed in thousands of de-
ﬂated rubles per capita.
The source for lending per capita by region of lender and loan interest
rate charged by the regional banks is “A Guide to Russian Bank Data”
(Karas and Schoors, 2010), as meticulously collected from quarterly re-
ports put out by Moscow-based information agency “Interfax” (www.
interfax.ru). Interfax publishes quarterly an extensive list of items from
the ﬁnancial statements and regulatory ratios of all Russian banks. Thethese two regions are included.
12 We drop three small regions for which data are limited including the Jewish Autono-
mous oblast, theKomi-PermAutonomousoblast and TaimyrAutonomousdistrict.We also
drop the war-torn Chechen Republic and Ingush Republic for which data are also limited.
We also drop the autonomous republics of Khanti-Mansiisk and Yanalo-Nenetsk because
the lack data for the 1990s.
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charged to ﬁrms and individuals. Lending per capita by region of lender
is computed as the total stock of loans to private ﬁrms and households
made by the banks in a region during the period 2002–2006. While
the advantage of these data is that they include the entire population
of banks, the downside is that theymay capture lending to ﬁrms and in-
dividuals in other states. This is a problem primarily for Moscow and
St. Petersburg, because banks registered in these cities often make
loans throughout Russia. Thus, Moscow and St. Petersburg are not
included in our baseline analysis. However, to be safe, we include data
on aggregate lending per capita by region of the borrower during the pe-
riod 2003–2006, the source of which is the Bulletin of Banking Statistics:
Regional Supplement (Central Bank of Russia, various years).13
Our primary outcomes of interest include ﬁnance during 2002–
2006; per capita income growth from 1996 to 2007; per capita GNP
growth from 1996 to 2007; investment, employment and unemploy-
ment rates; and the number of small andmediumenterprises per capita
in 2007. All measures were collected by the Russian ofﬁcial statistical
agency (sources: Goskomstat, 1996, 2001, 2008a, 2008b, 2010).
Our data allow for the inclusion of many important control variables.
We askwhether the inclusion of these controls affects the stability of our
estimates, which tests whether the across-region variation in spetsbank
concentration appears to be as-good-as-random. We measure these
variables in 1996 or earlier, which is well before the period when bank
ﬁnance of the private sector emerges. Education in a region is taken
from 1994 Russia micro-census and is measured as the share of the
population at least ﬁfteen years old as of 1994 that has completed sec-
ondary school and has at least some post-secondary education (source:
Goskomstat, 1995). Another important potential determinant of future
growth is ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which is related to levels of
trust, corruption and ﬁnancial depth (see, for example, Alesina et al.,
2003). We use the standard measure14 using data from the All Union
Census of 1989 (Goskomstat, 1990), where higher values represent
more ethnically fragmented regions. We also have data on urban popu-
lation share in 1989 and1996, aswell asmigration inﬂowsper 10,000 in-
habitants in 1996 and 1986–1990 (source: Goskomstat, 1991, pp.88–
109, 2008a, 2010, 1992, pp. 49–51). In addition, since Moscow was and
is the ﬁnancial capital of the former Soviet Union and Russia, respective-
ly, we also include distance to Moscow. Finally, as argued by Acemoglu
et al. (2011, p.910) the size of the educated middle class in the Russian
regionsduring the end of the Soviet era in 1989 is an important predictor
of good political institutions andgood economic outcomes in theRussian
regions after the demise of the USSR. FollowingAcemoglu et al., wemea-
sure themiddle class in 1989 as the share of the regional population clas-
siﬁed as white collar workers (source: Gokomstat, 1991, pp.88–109).15
We also have several political measures in order to capture popular
sentiment regardingmarket reform, as these preferences maywell pre-
dict future growth after the fall of the Soviet Union. One suchmeasure is
the urban Jewish population in areas occupied by the Nazis during
World War II measured just prior to their invasion. As argued by
Acemoglu et al., 2011, this variable predicts the extent of the destruction
of the Soviet urban middle class during World War II and the subse-
quent anti-market and pro-Communist sentiment that persists long
after the fall of the Soviet Union. In addition, our data also contain a
measure of the regional importance of powerful elites inherited from
the former Soviet Union, which we proxy using voter participation
rates in the Russian regions in 1989.16 In what was considered to be
the ﬁrst open elections in Soviet history, Soviet citizens were allowed
to vote for some representatives to the national legislature. However,13 We measure 2003 loans as the average of the stock of loans held by private ﬁrms and
households in October 2002 and October 2003, and in 2006 average the stock of loans for
October 2005 and October 2006.
14 Where gi,reg is the number people in ethnic group i in a region, POPreg is the total pop-
ulation of the region, and J is the total number of ethnic groups.
15 The other groups include blue collar workers, collective farmers and private farmers.
16 This argument is taken from Berezkin et al. (1989) and Berkowitz and DeJong (2011).these elections for the ﬁrst time allowed opposition candidates to
compete with Communists for power. Thus, in regions where the Com-
munist Party remained strong and well organized, the Communists
used their traditional administrative structures to mobilize voter turn-
out from traditional bases of support including state farms and state
owned enterprises. Thus, high voter turnout in these elections is an in-
dicator of the strength of the old Communist party.
Our last measures of the political environment are proxies for pro-
reform sentiment among the general population, in that they measure
the share of the regional population that voted for then President
Yeltsin in the presidential election in June of 1991, and the share
of the regional population that supported Yeltsin again in June of 1996
in the ﬁrst round of a presidential runoff election.17 In both elections,
Yeltsin stood for economic and political reform and his opponents
wanted a return to the socialist past; therefore, pro-market sentiment
is stronger when vote shares for Yeltsin are higher.
To proxy for the quality of political institutions, we use an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the appointed regional executive in 1991was an
insider and 0 if he/she was outsider (source: Remington, 2011). This
variable then picks up the extent to which entrenched Soviet elites
could remain in power after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Finally, our data include four direct measures of government in-
volvement in the mid-1990s and during the Soviet era including the
share of production subsidies in regional budget expenditures in
1995; the share of agriculture subsidies in the regional budget in
1995; the share of enterprises in commerce, public catering, and public
services owned as state or municipal property as of July 1, 1997; the
weighted average of goods and that had regulated prices in 1996
(source: Remington, 2011); and defense employment in 1985. Defense
employment ismeasured as the number ofworkers employed in the de-
fense industry per thousand employedworkers in 1985 (source: Gaddy,
1996). Gaddy (1996) argues that defense employment is a critical pre-
dictor of post-Soviet growth because the defense attracted some of
the most skilled and educated workers in the former Soviet Union.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Figures are taken from the
last years of the Soviet Union when there was no market-based banking
and during 1995–1996 in Russia when banks were not a signiﬁcant
source of external ﬁnance for private ﬁrms and households. In addition,
we show statistics separately for regions with more and fewer than 1.4
spetsbanks permillion,which is themedian number of spetsbanks across
the regions. This was done to enable evaluation of the identifying as-
sumption that these groups should otherwise trend similarly over time.18
As shown in Table 1, by construction these two groups have signiﬁ-
cantly different levels of banking. This highlights the relatively high de-
gree of variation in the full sample, where the number of spetsbanks per
million people ranges from 0 to 10, averages 1.9, and has a standard de-
viation of 1.9. In addition, consistent with our understanding of how
non-spetsbanks and new banks chose to locate near spetsbanks in the
last years of the USSR and the early years of the Russian Federation,
we note there are more non-spetsbanks in High Spetsbank regions.
However,while there are somewhatmore newbanks inHigh Spetsbank
regions, these differences are small (0.57 spetsbanks or 0.30 of a stan-
dard deviation) and statistically insigniﬁcant. We provide more evi-
dence about the potential correlation between early spetsbanks and
new banks later in this section.
Importantly, there are few other statistically distinguishable differ-
ences between regionswith high and low concentrations of spetsbanks.
Only 3 of 19 differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level and
only 1 of 19 at the 5% level. This is approximately what one would ex-
pect observe due to chance. Regionswithmore spetsbanks experienced
somewhat different levels of migration, though the difference of 4317 We obtain similar results if we use the second round of the election in July of 1996.
18 In the main analysis, we exploit the continuous variation in spetsbank concentration.
Here, for ease of illustration, we simply categorize regions into two groups based on
spetsbank concentration.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for states in 1995–1996, by spetsbank concentration.
Low spetsbank High spetsbank Difference Observations
Banking:
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population 0.66 2.27 1.61⁎⁎⁎ 74
(0.43) (1.74) (0.29)
Non-spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population 1.97 4.35 2.39⁎⁎⁎ 74
(1.46) (4.38) (0.74)
New banks in October 1995, per million population 5.45 6.03 0.57 74
(0.89) (1.00) (1.33)
Demographics:
Population (millions), 1996 2.01 1.55 −0.46 74
(1.25) (1.25) (0.29)
Share of 15-year olds with at least some tertiary education, 1994 12.9 13.5 0.627 74
(2.0) (2.2) (0.49)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1990 0.30 0.32 0.03 74
(0.22) (0.19) (0.05)
Share of middle class in 1989 0.29 0.31 0.01 74
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Urban population share, 1989 36.5 40.5 4.1 74
(20.4) (22.5) (5.0)
Urban population share, 1996 67.9 68.9 1.1 74
(10.3) (13.8) (2.8)
Migration per 10,000, 1986–1990 5.69 6.66 0.97 74
(42.49) (38.72) (9.49)
Migration per 10,000, 1996 19.9 −23.1 −43.01⁎⁎ 74
(55.9) (118.7) (21.2)
Distance to Moscow (km) 1753.5 2823.1 1070⁎ 74
(1758.4) (3310.9) (607.50)
Political environment:
% of Urban Jewish Population in 1939 in regions subsequently occupied by the Nazis 0.09 0.08 −0.01 74
(0.22) (0.24) (0.05)
Strength of Communist Party, 1989 (proxied by participation in Soviet elections) 88.2 86.6 −1.7 74
(5.8) (6.3) (1.4)
Support for Yeltsin, 1991 53.6 50.9 −2.8 74
(10.2) (12.7) (2.7)
Support for Yeltsin, 1996 31.2 32.9 1.7 74
(8.7) (10.2) (2.2)
Institutions:
Appointed Governor, 1991, Insider or Outsider 0.30 0.17 −0.13 74
(0.41) (0.34) (0.09)
Government involvement in markets:
Budget subsidies, 1995 17.0 13.1 −3.9 74
(14.8) (4.6) (2.6)
Agricultural subsidies, 1995 9.0 10.4 1.4 74
(4.6) (6.0) (1.2)
Defense employment per 1000 employed workers, 1985 2.5 2.0 −0.5⁎ 70
(1.3) (1.2) (0.3)
Share of municipal and state enterprises, July 1, 1997 18.2 24.8 6.6 74
(15.0) (21.1) (4.2)
Weighted average of goods and services with regulated prices, 1996 16.4 14.4 −2.0 74
(10.4) (6.9) (2.1)
Notes: Figures represent the average across all states during that time period. Standard deviations/robust standard errors are in parentheses. Low andHigh Spetsbank refer to regionswith
below- and above-median spetsbanks per million.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Moscow is also somewhat different with high-concentration regions lo-
cated an average of 900 km further away than regions with fewer
spetsbanks per million population. Finally, defense employment per
1000 employed workers in 1985 was marginally different.
However, the overwhelming pattern in Table 1 is the similarity be-
tween the two groups: they have similar levels of education, urban
population shares, political environment, institutional quality, and
government involvement in the economy. While this is somewhat
surprising given that politics and institutions in particular have been
shown to be drivers of ﬁnance,19 it is consistent with what we would19 See Malmendier (2009).expect based on our understanding of how spetsbanks were created
by Soviet bureaucrats.
Table 2 also contains summary statistics for regions with low and
high concentrations of spetsbanks for variables available both circa
1996 and 2006. Thus, these results offer a preview of the primary results
of the paper on the impact of bank privatization, as well as a way to see
whether other plausibly exogenous covariates are changing systemati-
cally over time.
As shown in Table 2, banking in Russia took off quickly between
1996 and the post-ﬁnancial crisis time period of 2002–2006. While
real loans per capita (in 2007 rubles) were only 30 and 50 rubles for
the two groups in 1996, this increased to over 1000 and 2000 rubles
per capita. It is also striking all three kinds of banks – spetsbanks, non-
spetsbanks and new banks –made more loans in the High-Spetsbank
Table 2
Descriptive statistics before and after modern banking, by presence of spetsbanks.
1996 (Prior to modem banking in Russia) 2006
Low spetsbank High spetsbank Low spetsbank High spetsbank
Spetsbanks, per million population 0.7 2.3 0.5 1.6
(0.4) (1.7) (0.5) (1.8)
Non-spetsbanks, per million population 2.0 4.4 1.1 2.3
(1.5) (4.4) (1.2) (2.5)
New banks, per million population 4.0 4.4 2.0 2.9
(0.7) (0.7) (0.3) (0.5)
Bank loans to households and ﬁrms 0.03 0.05 1.41 2.31
(Thousands of rubles per capita) (0.03) (0.05) (1.31) (2.67)
Loans by spetsbanks 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.57
(0.02) (0.02) (0.47) (0.74)
Loans by Soviet-era non-spetsbanks 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.54
(0.01) (0.01) (0.68) (0.80)
Loans by new banks 0.01 0.02 0.72 1.20
(0.01) (0.03) (0.94) (2.11)
Real income per capita in rubles April 2007 = 100 4227 5004 8296 8723
(1738) (2038) (2677) (3242)
Employment rate (%) 93.7 91.4 89.7 89.8
(7.6) (5.5) (5.9) (5.9)
Unemployment rate (%) 10.6 10.6 7.3 6.7
(4.7) (3.7) (3.9) (3.1)
Migration 19.9 −23.1 −2.5 −11.9
(55.9) (118.7) (35.4) (39.3)
% Urban 67.9 68.9 67.9 69.1
Population, millions 2.01 1.55 1.92 1.46
(1.25) (1.25) (1.25) (1.23)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Low and High Spetsbank refer to regions with below- and above-median spetsbanks per million population, respectively. Banking ﬁgures
shown in Column 4 are for 2002–2006. Bank loans to private sector prior to modern banking are from the last 2 quarters of 1997, as this is the earliest time for which reasonable data
coverage is available.
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spetsbanks from the last years of the Soviet Union may have inﬂuenced
ﬁnance through each kind of bank because many of the original
spetsbanks from1995 survived through2006, and the original inﬂuence
of spetsbanks on non-spetsbank and new bank location persisted. Sug-
gestive evidence for this mechanism is the high correlations between
the regional concentration of spetsbanks in 1995with the regional con-
centration of spetsbank survivors (0.63), non-spetsbank survivors
(0.48) and new banks (0.52) in 2006, respectively. We explore these
potential mechanisms later on in the paper.
However, what is important for our research design is this increase
in banking was not accompanied by a systematic change in other plau-
sibly exogenous variables such as percent urban or population, which is
consistent with the assumption of our research design. It also appears
that the divergence in banking did not cause a divergence in real income
per capita growth. Speciﬁcally, while real per capita incomewent up by
96% on average in states with below-median spetsbank concentration,Fig. 1. Spetsbank concentration and per capita lending from 2002 to 2006.it went up by only 74% in states with above-median spetsbank concen-
tration. These patterns are also apparent from Figs. 1 and 2, where Fig. 1
shows the positive relationship between the log of per capita lending
during 2002–2006 and the number of spetsbanks in 1995, and Fig. 2
shows the lack of such a relationship between the annualized in-
crease in real income per capita from 1996 to 2007 and the number
of spetsbanks in 1995. Along similar lines, Fig. 3 shows that per capita
lending in high-spetsbank regions quickly outpaced lending in low-
spetsbank regions between 1997 and 2007, while Fig. 4 shows that
per capita real income did not.
The increased presence of spetsbanks did appear to increase the em-
ployment rate, as shown in Table 2. This is intriguing, as it gives some
indication of what the spetsbanks might be doing with their private
lending, if not funding productivity-enhancing projects.
Table 3 contains summary statistics for spetsbanks and all other
banks in 1995 and 2006. As expected, the ownership of both types of
banks is overwhelmingly private at the beginning and end of the sampleFig. 2. Spetsbank concentration and per capita income growth from 1996 to 2007.
Fig. 3. Lending per capita from 1996 to 2007, by spetsbank concentration. Fig. 4. Real income per capita from 1996 to 2007, by spetsbank concentration.
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fewer exits of spetsbanks: roughly half of the spetsbanks in operation
in 1995 were still in operation as of 2006, compared to 37% for all
other banks. New entry is limited as only 4% of all other banks operating
in 2006 had registered after 2005. Finally, despite the fact that not all the
spetsbanks survived, they maintained a sizable market share of lending
to private ﬁrms and households of roughly 20% in 2006.
5. Results
5.1. The correlation between spetsbank concentration and pre-banking
income levels and growth
As described earlier, the identifying assumption of our study is that
regions with high concentrations of spetsbanks in 1995 would have
had similar levels of ﬁnance and economic growth after 2002 compared
to other regions. Here we formally examine that assumption by asking
whether regional spetsbank concentration is correlated with income
levels or growth in the period before modern banking in Russia. Esti-
mates are shown in Table 4, and are not statistically different from
zero. Point estimates indicate that regions with one more spetsbank
per million population had 4% higher per capita income in 1996 and
grew 0.4 percentage points faster per year. This is consistent with the
identifying assumption and suggests that if anything, the types of re-
gions that hadmore spetsbanksmight have had better economic growth
prospects than other regions.
5.2. The effect of spetsbanks on banking capacity in themodern banking era
We now examine whether higher concentration of spetsbanks in
1995 increases banking capacity once modern banking takes hold in
Russia. The raw data are shown in Figs. 1 and 3, while the estimation re-
sults are shown in Table 5. There are three speciﬁcations corresponding
to each outcome. The ﬁrst includes no controls, while the second con-
trols for non-spetsbanks and new banks, per million population in
1995, the log of per capita income in 1996 and all other pre-banking
characteristics from Table 1. By examining the stability of the coefﬁcient
to the inclusion of these controls, we intuitively ask whether the varia-
tion in spetsbank concentration is orthogonal to observed determinants
of ﬁnance and growth, in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). The third20 In Moscow and St. Petersburg there was very little foreign ownership in 1995, and by
2006 5.6% of the spetsbank survivor and 7.4% of all other bankswere foreign owned. This is
additional evidence that Moscow and St. Petersburg are quite different than all other
Russian regions.column includes the regions containing the capital cities of Moscow
and St. Petersburg, which are outliers in terms of foreign investment,
growth, and ﬁnance.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 5 estimate the effect of spetsbank
concentration on the log of per capita lending in 2002–2006, as mea-
sured by the state of the lender. As described earlier, these are the
most reliable datawe have, as they come from banks' administrative re-
cords and include the entire population. Results in column 1 indicate
that having one more spetsbank per million population—or about a
½ standard deviation increase in spetsbanks—causes a statistically sig-
niﬁcant 11% increase in per capita lending. Adding controls in column
2 increases this estimate to 22%. Doing so also increases the R-squared
signiﬁcantly from 0.04 to 0.66, which suggests that the controls are
explaining much of the cross-regional variation in lending over this
time period. Using the intuition formalized by Altonji et al. (2005), this
suggests that if anything, our estimates may understate the true impact
of spetsbanks on total lending. Finally, we note that including Moscow
and St. Petersburg in column3 changes the estimate only slightly to 21%.
In columns 4 through 6 of Table 5, we show results using a second
measure of regional lending compiled by the Central Bank of Russia.
While this measure falls somewhat short of the gold standard of admin-
istrative data, the advantage is that regional lending is deﬁned at the
level of the borrower. Results indicate that having one more spetsbank
in a region increases lending during 2003–2006 by 12 to 14%, all of
which are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and two of which are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Finally, in columns 7 through 9 we estimate the effect of spetsbanks
on the (volume-weighted) average interest rate charged on loans in
each region. Estimates vary from−0.27 to 0.13. None is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level, and all estimates are economically small compared to
the average annual rate in 2006 of 16.6%.
We next focus on which banks are responsible for the increase in ﬁ-
nance in high-spetsbank regions. While we would certainly expect a
large part of the increase in lending to come from the spetsbank succes-
sors themselves, as described earlier there are also reasons to expect
why there may be more loans from non-spetsbanks and new banks
that chose to locate near spetsbanks in the early 1990s. Results are
shown in Table 6, where the ﬁrst three columns replicate the ﬁrst
three columns of Table 5, and the remaining columns show results for
lending by spetsbank survivors, lending by non-spetsbank survivors,
and lending by new banks that enter after the demise of the Soviet
Union. Estimates of the effect of lending by spetsbank survivors range
fromanunconditional estimate of 16% that is not statistically signiﬁcant,
to estimates of 71 and 73% once including controls, which are signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Thus, while the estimates are more sensitive to the
Table 3
Bank ownership structure and market share.
1995 2006
Spetsbanks Other banks Spetsbanks Other banks
Percent privately owned 99.5 98.7 99.0 97.2
Foreign owned 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Persistence— percent of banks operating in 1995 still operating in 2006 – – 51.5 37.2
Entrants — percent of banks operating in 2006 that did not exist in 1995 _ _ 0.0 4.0
Percent market share of total private lending in Russia – – 20.5 79.5
Number of banks 196 1111 101 430
101D./J.D.E.110(2014)93--106inclusion of controls than the estimates on aggregate lending, there is
evidence of a large increase in lending by spetsbank survivors in regions
with more early spetsbanks.
In contrast, there is much less evidence that a higher early concen-
tration of spetsbanks led to increases in regional lending by non-
spetsbank survivors, or by new banks. Estimates for non-spetsbank
survivors range from 8 to 19%, only one of which is signiﬁcant at the
10% level, while estimates for lending by new banks are less than 10%
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, while there is some
suggestive evidence that higher initial concentrations of spetsbanks
induced more lending by other banks that chose to locate near them
in the early 1990s for reasons described earlier, by far themost compel-
ling evidence is that the increase in regional lending was driven by the
spetsbank successors themselves.
5.3. The effect of spetsbanks on investment, per capita income,
unemployment, and small business activity
Next, we turn to whether the increase in bank privatization induced
by the creation of spetsbanks affects investment, per capita income
growth, per capita GNP growth, employment rates, unemployment
rates, or the number of small and medium enterprises per capita. Re-
sults are shown in Table 7. As shown in Panel A, there is no evidence
that additional spetsbanks increase real per capita income growth or
real per capita GNP growth. In contrast, point estimates are negative
and, in some cases, statistically signiﬁcant. For example, in our preferred
speciﬁcation in column 2, results indicate that one additional spetsbank
reduced annualized per capita income growth from 1996 to 2007 by a
marginally signiﬁcant 0.29 percentage points. This is also clear from
Fig. 2, which graphs the percent increase in real per capita income
from 1996 to 2007 against spetsbank concentration. Results for annual
per capita GNP growth are similar: column 5 suggests that one addi-
tional spetsbank reduced per capita GNP growth by a marginally signif-
icant 0.56 percentage points.
Importantly, estimates remain relatively stable with the inclusion of
22 controls measuring per capita income in 1996, non-spetsbank con-
centration in 1995, new bank concentration in 1995, demographics, in-
stitutions, political environment, and government involvement in the
economy. For example, adding controls to the annual per capita income
growth model (from column 1 to column 2) changes the coefﬁcient by
only 0.02 percentage points, and doing the same for GNP per capitaTable 4
Correlation between spetsbank concentration and pre-banking income and income
growth.
Dependent variable: Log 1996 income 1 Annual growth rate 1993–96 2
Spetsbanks in October 1995,
per million population
0.043 0.432
(0.03) (0.42)
Observations 74 72
Notes: Each column represents a different regression. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.growth rate (from column 4 to column 5) changes it only by 0.12
percentage points. This is true despite the fact that in both cases, the ad-
ditional controls have substantial explanatory power: the r-squared in-
creases by 45 to 55 percentage points. This gives us some comfort that
the variation in spetsbank concentration is exogenous, and that the in-
clusion of unobserved determinants would not change our conclusion
that privatized banking in Russia does not improve economic growth.
We also note that none of our estimates are affected by the inclusion
ofMoscowand St. Petersburg,whichwere and remain theﬁnancial cen-
ters of Russia.
Interestingly, we do ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that additional
banking may increase employment rates and reduce unemployment,
though most estimates are imprecisely estimated.21
6. Interpretation and discussion
Our ﬁndings are somewhat surprising: even though privatized
banking increases lending, there is no impact on growth. Put differently,
while the presence of an additional spetsbank induced an 11 to 22 per-
cent increase in lending over the following 10 years, it did not increase
growth in GNP or personal income. In contrast, point estimates suggest
that if anything, the additional spetsbank reduced economic growth
rates. We also ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that spetsbanks may
have instead reduced unemployment.
This pattern of results is intriguing, as it indicates spetsbanks be-
haved like traditional Soviet banks, despite the fact that they were
privatized and competed against other private banks. For example,
under the Soviet regime, the role of the “banks”was often to help tradi-
tional largeﬁrms retainworkers, in part to build popular support for the
regional political elites and in part because these ﬁrms provided public
goods such as health services and education to the populace and thus
helped maintain social stability (see Remington, 2011).
One potential explanation of these results is the persistence of po-
litical connections in spetsbanks after privatization. If banks retain
their political connections and objectives after privatization, the impli-
cations are signiﬁcant for countries that privatize their longtime state-
owned banks (such as Russia) as well as for countries that consider
nationalizing their banks during times of ﬁnancial crisis. That is, to
the extent that political connections formed during nationalization
persist even after eventual privatization, nationalization may impair
the long-term performance of banks.
We use two approaches to assess whether political connections
persisted. First, we check whether key employees in the privatized
spetsbanks held similar positions in Soviet-era banks, compared to21 In many respects the average effects of the spetsbanks on ﬁnance and outcomes in
Russia during 2000–2007 is qualitatively similar to the average effects of bank nationaliza-
tion on credit markets in India circa 1980 as studied by Cole (2009). Spetsbanks in Russia
cause more lending to the private sector: similarly, credit markets in India with national-
ized banks had faster credit growth. In Russia, the average effects of spetsbanks on growth
and investment in Russia are negligible: similarly, in India bank nationalization has no dis-
cernible effect on agricultural outcomes. However, while spetsbanks cause marginal in-
creases in employment and reductions in unemployment, bank nationalization “may
have slowed the growth of employment in the more developed sectors of trade and ser-
vice” (Cole, 2009, p.33).
23 In results available upon request, we ﬁnd some similarities between spetsbanks and
all other banks on other dimensions. Speciﬁcally, spetsbank successors do not hold signif-
icantly more government deposits and do not reap signiﬁcantly higher proﬁts from
government-owned ﬁrms than their counterparts. Moreover, while spetsbank successors
receive somewhat more transfers from federal and regional governments during 1999–
2006, this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Our measure of proﬁts from govern-
Table 6
The effect of spetsbank presence on banking capacity, by type of banking.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total log per cap. lending
2002–2006
Log per cap. lending by
spetsbank survivors
Log per capita lending by
non-spetsbank survivors
Log per capita lending by
new banks
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population 0.11⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎ 0.16 0.71⁎⁎⁎ 0.73⁎⁎⁎ 0.19⁎ 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20) (0.08) (0.18) (0.19)
Non-Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population – 0.00 0.00 – −0.09 −0.10 – 0.19⁎⁎ 0.17⁎⁎ – −0.10 −0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
New banks in October 1995, per million population – 0.02 0.00 – −0.04 0.00 – −0.02 0.00 – 0.08⁎ 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations/Regions 74 74 76 74 74 76 74 74 76 74 74 76
R-squared 0.04 0.66 0.77 0.02 0.58 0.62 0.04 0.58 0.66 0.00 0.51 0.53
Includes controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Capital cities are included (Moscow and St. Petersburg) No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The outcome is lending by state of lender between 2002 and 2006. Each column represents a separate regression Household lending is deﬂated by the CPI where April 2007 = 100,
and the ﬁrst two quarters of 2007 are included. Loan interest data in 2006 ismissing for three regions including the Kursk, Magadan and the Republic of Kalmykia. Controls include the log
of per capita income in 1996 and all of the pre-banking characteristics shown in Table 1. Spetsbank (Non-Spetsbank) survivors are banks registered (not registered) as spetsbanks during
the Soviet era that are still in operation from 2002 to 2006. New banks are banks registered after the demise of the Soviet Union and in operation from 2002 to 2006.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 5
The effect of spetsbank presence on banking capacity.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Log per cap. lending 2002–2006,
by state of lender
Log per cap. lending 2003–2006, by
state of borrower
Loan interest rate charged in 2006
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population 0.11⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎ 0.21⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.13⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ 0.13 −0.27 −0.26
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Non-Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population – 0.00 0.00 – −0.03 −0.02 – 0.05 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08)
New Banks, per million population – 0.02 0.00 – 0.00 −0.00⁎ – 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations/regions 74 74 76 74 74 76 71 71 73
R-squared 0.04 0.66 0.77 0.12 0.77 0.81 0.01 0.73 0.74
Includes controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Capital cities are included (Moscow and St Petersburg) No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Household lending is deﬂated by the CPI where April 2007 = 100, and the ﬁrst two quarters of 2007 are included. Loan interest data
in 2006 is missing for three regions including the Kursk, Magadan and the Republic of Kalmykia. Controls include the log of per capita income in 1996 and all of the pre banking charac-
teristics shown in Table 1.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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vant personnel data is given. In addition, in order to take advantage
of all available data we use a sample that includes Moscow and
St. Petersburg.22 One caveat of this analysis is that because the sampling
procedure is not random, results are suggestive. The results are reported
in Table 8, where data are from 1995. While there was little difference
between spetsbanks and other banks in the political connections
of the board members, who almost all represent the new shareholders,
there weremajor differences in the political connections of members of
the management committee (i.e., the directors). Speciﬁcally, privatized
spetsbanks were much more likely to have politically connected
directors (75.9 versus 25.4%), as well as a politically connected General
Director (89.9 versus 28.6%) and Head Bookkeeper (85.9 versus 31.3%).
These ﬁndings suggest that political connections established in the
original spetsbanks were persistent through at least the mid-1990s,
which potentially explains the banks' ineffectiveness.
In our second approach for determining whether spetsbank succes-
sors remained connected to the government, we ask how similar
spetsbanks are to other banks in their region. Speciﬁcally,we askwhether
spetsbank successors charge similar interest rates as the other banks
of similar size who operate in the same region. We also ask whether22 Thus, we expand our sample of spetsbanks in 1995 from 196 to 236.spetsbank successors generate a greater share of their interest income
from government and government-owned ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, using
bank-level data,we regress the outcome of interest (interest rate charged
or share of income) on regional ﬁxed effects, log of bank assets, and an
indicator for whether the bank had its origins as a spetsbank.
Results are shown in Table 9. Using data from the period 1999–2006,
we ﬁnd that the biggest difference between spetsbanks and all other
banks is that spetsbanks receive signiﬁcantly more of their interest in-
come from ﬁrms owned by the government (1.58 percentage points),
and substantially less from households (3.14 percentage points).
These differences are striking, as spetsbanks and all other commercial
banks had been privatized since at least the early 1990s. Thus, in princi-
ple, the spetsbank successors should not be receiving additional ﬁnan-
cial support from the government.23ment owned ﬁrms is interest payments received net of expenses paid to government
owned ﬁrms. Our measure of transfers from the government is interest payments from
the government net of expenditures paid. Inmaking these calculationswe control for bank
assets and region and quarter ﬁxed effects during 1999–2006.
Table 7
The effect of banking on income growth, GNP growth, investment, small businesses, employment, and unemployment.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Panel A: Income and investment Annual Growth Rate in Income per
capita, 1996–2007
Annual Growth Rate in Real GDP
per capita, 2001–2007
Log Investment Per Capita in 2007
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population −0.31⁎⁎ −0.29⁎ −0.33⁎⁎ −0.44⁎ −0.56⁎ −0.57⁎ 0.012 −0.089⁎ −0.092⁎⁎
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26) (0.31) (0.30) (0.029) (0.047) (0.044)
Non-Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population – (0.11) 0.12⁎ – 0.34⁎ 0.37⁎⁎ – 0.021 0.023
(0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.018) (0.017)
New Banks in October 1995, per million population – 0.06⁎⁎ −0.01⁎ – 0.05 −0.01⁎ – 0.005 −0.002⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations/regions 74 74 76 74 74 76 74 70 72
R-squared 0.09 0.66 0.66 0.08 0.54 0.54 0.00 0.78 0.78
Panel B: small enterprises and employment Log small and medium enterprises
per capita in 2007
Employment rate in 2007 Unemployment rate in 2007
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population 0.023 −0.005 0.002 0.16 −0.10 0.16 0.04 −0.30 −0.33⁎
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.31) (0.43) (0.48) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19)
Non-spetsbanks in October 1995, per million population – 0.011 0.010 – −0.04 0.00 – −0.17⁎ −0.16⁎
(0.014) (0.014) (0.24) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09)
New banks in October 1995, per million population - −0.012 −0.001 – −0.31⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 – 0.08⁎ 0.01⁎
(0.009) (0.001) (0.10) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Observations/regions 74 74 76 74 74 76 74 74 76
R-squared 0.01 0.66 0.74 0.00 0.66 0.59 0.00 0.80 0.80
Includes controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Capital cities are included No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression Each speciﬁcation controls for the lagged level of the dependent variable in 1996 (2001 for GNP growth and invest-
ment). Controls include the log of per capita income in 1996 as well as all of the pre-banking characteristics shown in Table 1. The average annual per capita income growth rate was 5.8%.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 1%. level.
Table 8
Political connections within spetsbanks and all other banks in 1995.
Spetsbanks Other banks
% politically connected board members 1.5 1.4
% politically connected directors 75.9 25.4
% politically connected general director 89.9 28.6
% politically connected head bookkeeper 85.9 31.3
Observations 99 146
Notes: Each ﬁrm has one General Director and one Head Bookkeeper.
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duce an increase in private lending, they remain more connected to
government than other banks. This relationship exists despite the fact
that spetsbank successors are operating in competitive markets as pri-
vate ﬁrms, and, to our knowledge, free from any ﬁnancial support
from the government. Yet, the persistence of a business relationship
with governmentmay help explain why spetsbank lending does not in-
crease growth. Perhaps spetsbanks are unable to develop the culture
and capabilities necessary to make productivity-enhancing loans, or
perhaps they are pursuing other objectives that have persisted due to
their origins, such as reducing unemployment.
To the extent that spetsbank successors lend to inefﬁcient ﬁrms—
either intentionally to increase employment,24 or unintentionally due
to poor capital allocation skills25—it raises questions about the impact
of this lending on the private sector. For example, Caballero et al.
(2008) present compelling evidence that by keeping credit ﬂowing to
otherwise insolvent borrowers nicknamed “zombies” by the authors,24 We attempted to acquire data on employment at the regional level at ﬁrms that were
formerly state-owned—that is, ﬁrms known to be less efﬁcient—in order to examine
whether spetsbanks increased employment at those ﬁrms, but we were unable to do so.
25 We did compare the rate of non-performing loans across spetsbanks to non-
spetsbanks as a way of measuring loan quality. However, non-performing loan rates are
small across all banks inRussia,whichwe suspect is due in large part to loan restructurings
that would make it hard for us to infer much from those data.Japanese banks suppressed job destruction and creation and lowered
productivity.
However, while poor capital allocation is one explanation for why
spetsbank lending does not cause positive growth, another explanation
is that the institutional context in Russia makes it difﬁcult for any
lending to lead to investment and economic growth. For example, if
ﬁrm owners do not believe their property rights will be protected
after they take risks to expand and grow their business, they may not
be willing to invest.
To test more directly for whether our ﬁnding that zero or even
negative growth is caused by spetsbank behavior or regional institu-
tional context, we exploit the heterogeneity of both across the different
regions of Russia. Speciﬁcally, we use measures of bank behavior taken
prior to 2001, and ask whether different types of spetsbanks have dif-
ferent effects on economic growth from 2001 to 2007.
The ﬁrst measure of bank behavior captures how closely spetsbanks
are connected to the federal government. Spetsbanks that are highly
connected receive federal government transfers, which are measured
as interest income received from federally owned ﬁrms net of payments
to these ﬁrms as a share of total loans. In each region, then,we can com-
pute these transfers to spetsbanks during 1999–2001 and use banks as-
sets asweights. However, onemightworry that the level of government
involvement by spetsbanks within a region is endogenous to current
and future expected growth, or that there are region-speciﬁc differences
that cause both high government involvement by all banks as well
as future growth. Consequently, we ask whether regions in which
spetsbanks are less connected to government than their counterparts in
the same region experience higher growth as a result.26
Our secondmeasure captures spetsbank similarity to other banks in
their region more directly. Speciﬁcally, we regress spetsbank status on
a set of variables describing sources and share of deposits and loan
activity as well as log assets from 1997 to 2001, and then calculate
an F-statistic for each region testing whether the coefﬁcients on the
deposit and loan variables are jointly equal to zero. We normalize the26 The analysis is thus necessarily limited to regions that have spetsbanks.
Table 9
Differences between the business practices of spetsbank successors and all other banks, 1999–2006.
Interest rates charged to: The share of interest income that comes from:
Firms Individuals Government Central bank
of Russia
Domestic
banks
Foreign banks Firms owned
by the govt.
Private
ﬁrms
Households
Spetsbank survivors,
1999–2006
0.14 −1.89⁎⁎ 0.64 −0.11 1.09 0.32 1.58⁎⁎⁎ 0.53 −3.14⁎⁎⁎
(0.71) (0.74) (0.43) (0.08) (0.90) (0.32) (0.59) (1.71) (0.98)
Observations 18,669 17,964 19,704 19,704 19,704 19,704 19,704 19,704 19,704
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Each speciﬁcation includes logged bank assets, region ﬁxed effects, and quarterﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. Private ﬁrms include domestic and foreign ﬁrms and registered entrepreneurs. Firms owned by the government include federal and sub-federal ﬁrms.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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thus measures the degree of to which spetsbanks' deposit and loan be-
havior is different from other banks of similar size in their region.
To measure the institutional context of each region, we use a mea-
sure of property rights protection constructed by experts at the
Moscow Carnegie Center under the direction of Nikolai Petrov and
Alexei Titkov. It is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where higher numbers
mean that greater protection of property rights.27
Results are shown in Table 10, where the ﬁrst four rows contain
coefﬁcients. The last three rows use those coefﬁcients to estimate the
marginal effects of spetsbanks that have different levels of government
involvement, similarity with other banks in their region, or operate in
regions with differing protections of property rights. Importantly, the
marginal effect of spetsbanks on lending does not vary signiﬁcantly by
these three factors, as shown in Appendix Table A1. This means that
any differential effects on economic outcomes are not due to differences
in the magnitude of the ﬁrst stage on the quantity of lending. We
examine three outcomes: annual growth in real personal income from
2001 to 2007, annual real GNP growth from 2001 to 2007, and log in-
vestment in 2007.
Several patterns emerge. First, spetsbanks that operate in regions
with better institutions—namely, better protections of property rights—
have a signiﬁcantly more positive effect on growth. For example,
columns 7–10 indicate that operating in a region where protections
of property rights are classiﬁed as one standard deviation better
(0.75 points) causes the marginal spetsbank per million population to
increase growth by between 0.67 and 0.87 percentage points. This
suggests that the institutional context of banking matters, and is con-
sistent with the conclusions of others highlighting the importance of
institutions for economic growth with respect to bank privatization
(e.g., Andrianova et al., 2008) as well as more generally (e.g., Acemoglu
et al., 2001).
There is less clear evidence that having connections to the federal
government is bad for growth. While these connections appear to
lower growth in real personal income, there is no evidence that it lowers
real annual GNP growth, and it somewhat counter-intuitively appears
to increase investment.28 For example, estimates in columns 7–8
imply that a one standard deviation increase in spetsbanks' relationship
to the federal government leads to between a 0.31 percentage point27 This is a measure taken during 1996–2000 of the “extent of economic liberalism and
protection of private ownership.” It is the earliest reliable measure that we could obtain.
This variable is broadly used by scholars studying the Russian regions and is described
in Nikolai Petrov, “Regional Models of Democratic Development,” in Michael McFaul,
Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, eds., Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian
Post-Communist Political Reform. (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2004): 239–267. These data can be downloaded from the website http://atlas.
socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml.
28 One potential explanation is that while spetsbanks with close connections to the fed-
eral governmentmay induce additional investment, itmay be investment aimedprimarily
at increasing employment, rather than productivity growth. Thiswould be consistentwith
the ﬁndings of Caballero et al. (2008) in Japan.reduction and a 0.28 percentage point increase in the annual growth
rate. However, there is much stronger evidence to suggest that
spetsbanks most different from other banks are bad for growth; esti-
mates in columns 9 and 10 indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in the dissimilarity index results in annual growth that is be-
tween 0.27 and 0.60 percentage points lower, though neither is quite
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The net impacts of these factors shown in the last three rows
of Table 10 suggests that while there is no effect of spetsbanks on eco-
nomic growth or investment on average (see columns 1, 6, and 11),
there is substantial heterogeneity depending on both the behavior of
the spetsbank as well as the institutional environment. For example,
themarginal effect of spetsbanks that are most connected to the federal
government or are the least similar to other banks in their region is to
reduce economic growth and investment, when they operate in a region
with poor protection of property rights. Speciﬁcally, 4 of the 8 estimates
on per capita income and GNP growth rates are signiﬁcant at the
5% level, and 3 of those are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In contrast,
spetsbanks that are not connected to government, or that appear to be-
have similarly to their non-spetsbank counterparts, increase economic
growthby between 0.3 and 1.1 percentage pointswhen they are located
in a region with strong property rights protections, though estimates
are somewhat imprecise.29
In summary, two interesting ﬁndings shed light on our result that
lending by spetsbank successors does not increase growth or invest-
ment, but does increase employment. We show that despite having
been privatized and subject to market competition, spetsbank succes-
sors have retained some of their historical relationships with govern-
ment. This provides a potential explanation for why spetsbanks may
lend to increase employment, rather than productivity. In addition,
the impact of spetsbank-induced lending on economic growth depends
on both the behavior of the spetsbanks and especially on the institu-
tional environment in which they operate.
7. Conclusions
This paper examines whether bank privatization is good for ﬁnance
and good for growth. To overcome biases due to selection and simulta-
neity, we exploit variation induced by the creation of state “banks” in29 If spetsbanks are indicative of the quality of ﬁnancial institutions in a region, then one
interpretation of theseﬁndings is that ﬁnancial development and property rights are com-
plements. When ﬁnancial institutions are bad (i.e., spetsbanks are different from other
banks, or they are connected to the federal government) and there is a low level of prop-
erty rights protections, thenan additional spetsbank reduces economic growth and invest-
ment. However, ifﬁnancial institutions are of high quality and there are strong protections
of property rights, then the marginal spetsbank has a positive impact on growth. In con-
trast, the general equilibrium trade model in Ju andWei (2011) predicts that when prop-
erty protections in a country are sufﬁciently strong, then at the margin better ﬁnancial
institutionsdonot promotemore trade (and, therefore, growth). However,whenproperty
rights protections are sufﬁciently weak, then an improvement in ﬁnancial institutions is
good for a country's comparative advantage and trade.
Table 10
The differential impact of spetsbanks on growth and investment by relationship to government, similarity to all other banks, and the extent of regional property rights protection.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate in real personal income,
2001–2007
Annual growth rate in real per capita GNP, 2001–2007 Log investment in 2007
Spetsbanks in October 1995, per million 0.36
(0.53)
−2.66***
(0.96)
−1.32
(142)
−1.52
(1.11)
−1.56
(1.41)
−0.34
(0.44)
−4.13***
(0.66)
−3.60***
(1.17)
−3.42***
(0.86)
−2.90**
(114)
−0.10
(0.06)
−0.34**
(0.14)
−0.40**
(0.18)
−0.12
(0.11)
−0.41
(0.24)
Spetsbanks × property rights protection
(higher→more protection)
0.80***
(0.29)
0.56
(0.52)
0.48
(0.33)
0.67
(0.46)
1.16***
(0.20)
1.16**
(0.41)
0.96***
(0.28)
0.89**
(0.41)
0.09**
(0.04)
0.10
(0.06)
0.03
(0.03)
0.11
(0.08)
Spetsbanks × Difference in Spetsbanks' vs
other banks' relationship with fed govt
(higher→ spetsbanks more involved)
−0.91
(0.55)
−0.39
(0.95)
−0.44
(0.37)
0.40
(0.70)
0.09**
(0.04)
0.10
(0.06)
Spetsbanks × within-region index of
differences between spetsbanks and
all other banks (higher→ less similar)
−0.55**
(0.26)
−0.30
(0.65)
−0.27
(0.17)
−0.60
(0.36)
−0.14**
(0.03)
0.01
(0.08)
Est. Marginal effect of spetsbank on region at:
10th Pctile of institutions; 90th pctile of
fed govt connection/dissimilarity with
other banks
−1.81**
(0.69)
−0.52
(107)
−0.4
(0.54)
−0.14
(0.74)
−2.18**
(0.45)
−0.96
(0.75)
−1.42***
(0.37)
−0.94***
(0.43)
−0.30***
(0.09)
−0.40***
(0.12)
−0.02
(0.05)
−0.20*
(0.10)
50th Pctile of institutions; 50th pctile of
fed govt connection/dissimilarity with
other banks
−0.25
(0.23)
0.38
(0.60)
0.06
(0.24)
0.52
(0.56)
−0.65***
(0.14)
−0.13
(0.32)
−0.47***
(0.17)
−0.08
(0.30)
−0.07*
(0.04)
−0.11
(0.05)
0.00
(0.03)
−0.09
(0.06)
90th Pctile of institutions; 10th pctile of
fed govt connection/dissimilarity with
other banks
0.95***
(0.33)
1.11
(0.90)
0.25
(0.34)
1.03
(0.78)
0.70***
(0.22)
0.87
(0.59)
0.34
(0.33)
0.5
(0.65)
0.10*
(0.05)
0.09
(0.09)
−0.05
(0.05)
0.02
(0.09)
Observations/regions 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 43 43 43 43 43
Includes additional controls Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. Each income growth speciﬁcation includes logged income in 2001; each GNP growth speciﬁcation includes logged GNP in 2001; each investment speciﬁcation controls for logged
investment in 2001. Each speciﬁcation that allows for interaction effects also allows for the direct effect of property rights protection, spetsbank relationship with the federal government, and/or the spetsbank similarity index. Additional controls
include the log of per capita income in 1996 as well as all of the pre-banking characteristics shown in Table 1.
Property rights protection is a measure constructed by experts at the Moscow Carnegie Center under the direction of Nikolai Petrov and Alexei Titkov and is measured on a scale of 1 to 5. The difference in spetsbanks* and all other banks' relationship
with the federal government is deﬁned as the difference between the share of bank asset weighted federal transfers to spetsbanks and other banks, where the federal transfer is interest payments net of payments from federally owned ﬁrms paid to
banks divided by the value of overall bank loans. The within-region index of differences between spetsbanks and non-spetsbanks is calculated as the normalized E-statistic arising from a region-speciﬁc regressions in which an indicator for spetsbank
status is regressed on a set of variables describing sources and share of deposits and loan activity.
(continued on next page)
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banking in Russia. Existing qualitative research on these spetsbanks
characterizes the locational decision as bureaucratic and exogenous to
economic factors, which is consistent with what we ﬁnd empirically.
Despite their Soviet origins, however, spetsbanks have become an
important source of lending in Russia: in 2006, privatized spetsbank
successors accounted for 20% of all lending to ﬁrms and households
in Russia.
Results indicate that while having one additional spetsbank permil-
lion population increases private lending up to 10 years later by 11 to
22%, this increase in lending does not cause an economicallymeaningful
increase in investment or economic growth. This is consistent with
other ﬁndings showing the persistence of the Soviet-era political con-
nections and management at spetsbanks into the era of privatization.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that the effectiveness of privatized
banking in causing economic growth was determined in part by the be-
havior of the spetsbanks and in larger part to the institutional environ-
ment in which they operated. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a one standard
deviation increase in the regional index of property rights protections
increases themarginal effect of a spetsbank on annual economic growth
by nearly one percentage point. Similarly, our results suggest that
spetsbanks that are either less connected to government, or are more
similar to their non-spetsbank counterparts, subsequently increase
economic growth. These latter ﬁndings are roughly consistent with
the conclusion of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), who argue that lending
quality, rather than volume, is responsible for growth.
Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that the origins and history
of banking institutions appear to persist even after privatization. As a
result, privatization by itself is insufﬁcient for turning state-owned
banks into effective generators of economic growth. Rather, a broader
strategy of breaking political connections and improving the protection
of property rights appears to be critical for bank privatization to be
successful in overcoming the legacy of non-market institutions.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.05.005.
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